

1. The expert meeting

On 18 and 19 February 2019, over 50 experts from the Lake Chad region and the broader international community, from academia, government, civil society and international organisations, met in The Hague in an informal setting. Recent analytical work funded by the French, German and Dutch governments and the World Bank informed their discussions. So did the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)'s and African Union Commission (AUC)'s Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin Region ('the Regional Strategy').

The multidisciplinary meeting focused on water and livelihood development in the Lake Chad region, as well as long-term stabilisation aimed at addressing root causes of conflict. The meeting's objective was to sharpen expert assessments, identify spaces to rebuild communities' resilience, and articulate a course of action to restore resilience in general conditions of deep uncertainty and political fragility in the countries concerned: Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun.

For the purposes of the meeting, the boundaries of the Lake Chad region were defined as in the recent study *Crisis and Development* by Géraud Magrin and others,¹ which analyses the region's trade and mobility systems connecting vast rural areas of livestock farming, agriculture and fisheries with the two major urban centres of Maiduguri and N'Djamena as well as dozens of smaller cities. At the heart of this region is a triangle formed by Lake Chad itself, N'Djamena and Maiduguri. The boundaries of the regional system extend up to 400 km north of the lake into the dry, pastoral zones of the Sahel, and up to 500 km south of the line Maiduguri-N'Djamena into the wetter zones of North Cameroon and North East Nigeria. The system extends up to 200 km west of Maiduguri and 200 km east of N'Djamena.

This note summarises the conclusions of the expert meeting. Participants agreed to share it widely, so that it can inform future decisions and stabilisation and development initiatives.

2. Setting the scene

Humanitarian situation and security

As of February 2019, the Lake Chad region humanitarian crisis remains one of the most severe in the world, with 2.5 million people uprooted and 3.6 million people food insecure. The security situation is volatile and precarious. In January and February 2019 alone, tens of thousands of people were newly displaced.

Most rural areas in North East Nigeria and across the borders with Niger, Cameroon and Chad are experiencing a continued high risk of insecurity, while most urban areas are relatively secure. In certain rural areas security has been restored, but the recovery has yet to start. The transition to recovery is often precarious. When humanitarian aid stops while the enabling environment for recovery is not yet in place or sufficiently supported, vulnerable groups are at risk of falling back into insecurity and being exposed once more to violence, abuse or harassment and human rights violations, often gender-based.

Demographic changes

Rapid demographic growth has changed the population structure in the Lake Chad region. As delineated in the recent study *Crisis and Development*, the region had a population of around 29 million in 2017. In this region alone, over half a million young people enter the labour market each year, 60% of them in North East Nigeria. Their limited education, reliance on contacts to get employment and high levels of inequality reduce their job prospects in an economy weakened by the ongoing conflict. Young women in particular are often barred from access to education and employment due to gender norms. In this context, even accelerating labour market entry yields no demographic dividend. Moreover, young people's lack of voice and agency, and the difficulties they face in transitioning to adulthood, autonomy and marriage in a society where age hierarchies limit their opportunities, contribute to their perceived and real social marginalisation. This is a socially and politically destabilising factor. It facilitates young people's recruitment by non-state armed groups, with promises and prospects of empowerment that a patriarchal society does not adequately provide.

¹ Géraud Magrin and Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos eds., *Crisis and Development: The Lake Chad Region and Boko Haram*, Paris: Agence Française de Développement, August 2018.

The displacement of over 2.5 million people, mostly from rural areas, as a result of violent conflict accelerates urbanisation towards both secondary and main cities. Many people who have moved to towns and cities may not return to their rural communities of origin when the security situation improves. The urban economy provides more diverse opportunities than the rural economy for the increasingly young workforce. Skills development remains an issue of concern, however.

Social fabric/social contract

Inequality has grown over the past few decades. Urban elites have done well; the rural and urban poor less so, with pastoralists left particularly marginalised. In recent years, violence – by non-state armed groups, government security forces and community militias – has disrupted mobility, the essential condition for livelihood resilience in the region. In unsafe areas, anyone can be a target of violence: women in search of firewood or water, farmers working their land, traders moving produce to markets and pastoralists grazing cattle can all be suspected of being part of or associated with non-state armed groups. Casualties run in the tens of thousands. Larger numbers of people have been displaced or wounded and/or left with physical and psychosocial disabilities and trauma. Societal divisions have deepened and trust has eroded: between citizens and government, between and within communities and their leaders, between young and old, between women and men. It will require prolonged, multifaceted intervention to restore safety and stability, enable dialogue and provide mental health and psychosocial support and transitional justice to promote reconciliation and heal societal divisions.

The social and political root causes of destabilisation in the region can be traced back many decades. Structural vulnerabilities existed long before they became apparent in the mid-2000s. Globalisation and the spread of mobile phones and connectivity may have played a role in transforming a mix of grievances about governance shortfalls, injustice, corruption and the political and social marginalisation of certain groups into a support base for violent extremism and armed opposition.

Resentment and anger against men and women who have joined and/or left non-state armed groups runs deep – in particular among those who have suffered from their violence. Often the distinction between perpetrators and victims is blurred and contested at communal level, which makes reintegration challenging. Additional challenges are posed by i) the marks that violence and the presence of non-state armed groups have left on different societal groups and ii) the impact of those who return to their community after flight and displacement or after defecting from non-state armed groups. While initiatives have started to restore the social fabric and mitigate tensions around the sharing of scarce resources, long-term measures and initiatives in the domain of dialogue and reconciliation are needed to reduce the risks of re-escalation in a conflictive social environment.

Livelihoods

The paradox of the ongoing Lake Chad region crisis is that natural resource conditions around the lake have been almost optimal for productivity over the past 20 years, while actual output has declined to a minimum. The lakeside communities have proved resilient and able to cope with chronic natural resource variability for centuries. Yet the political, social, and security stresses of the past decade have exceeded most people's coping capacity. The region has great potential as a hub for family farming, livestock and fisheries, not just in primary production but also in the cross-border trade and service economy that links production areas to markets. But what seems to be lacking is a shared regional socioeconomic vision for such a hub, in which communities thrive, develop and are secure, and a strategy to realise it.

Economic and mobility restrictions imposed by the military, designed to block revenue flow to non-state armed groups, have in practice paralysed livelihoods across the board. Regardless of their own assessment of security risks, in many productive places farmers are not allowed to work their land, fishermen are not allowed to fish and pastoralists are not allowed to herd their cattle. Moreover, many markets no longer function, as merchants are barred from transporting goods. While the region used to feed its population and employ millions, millions of people now depend on humanitarian aid. Livelihood collapse has deepened poverty and compromised people's dignity. Humanitarian aid has developed as a new domain of economic activity, creating new challenges of dependence, unpredictability and risks of large-scale diversion for private profit.

Governance

A combination of political and customary institutions has proven critical to proper natural resource and conflict management in parts of the Sahel. Yet given the current stress factors, the patchwork of community and state, informal and formal governance of the remote Lake Chad region has proven inadequate. There is no other way to explain why development indicators around the lake are so far

below national averages for each of the four countries that share the lake. Many lakeside communities never had schools, health clinics or water supply and sanitation infrastructure or services. Most young people have had minimal education, if any, and are ill-prepared for a fulfilling life and an adequate livelihood. An additional complicating factor for the Lake Chad region is the way it straddles four countries and two regional economic communities, and the fact that none of the four capitals gives much priority to the region's development.

More effective governance can be achieved, not by abandoning the hybrid system itself, but by strengthening formal/informal and community/state components and making the blend function better. Decentralisation requires customised rethinking, as it has been unevenly applied across the region, leaving local government structures chronically under-resourced. This cannot be resolved at local level alone. It requires action at (sub-)national and cross-border levels as well.

For most people in the region, the armed forces have been the primary, if not the only, interface with the formal state over the past decade. The military's primary goal has been to defeat non-state armed groups: by force, by disrupting opposition groups' revenue flows, etc. Its actions have often been heavy-handed: abuse, violence and harassment. Combined with the emergence of community militias, they have led to a militarisation of society, lowering the threshold for violence. Many people's experience of the state is negative, sometimes even more negative than their experience of non-state armed groups. Regaining communities' trust – winning hearts and minds – will require sustained government effort, true leadership, improved accountability and transparency. Positive signals that the government is committed to delivering, and that it knows how to deliver, are meagre at best. As long as ambiguity prevails, instability and marginalisation are likely to continue.

The legitimacy of community leaders who have become politicised or been involved in diverting humanitarian aid for their own benefit has taken a hit. Yet in general, community leaders' role remains crucial in dialogues to resolve conflicts, in redressing inequalities at community level, in reconciliation and confidence building, and in helping to articulate a shared vision of positive change.

Water

Historic data show chronic water resource variability in the Lake Chad region. Seasonal fluctuation is the oldest form of change. Mobility – now restricted by the security situation – has always been farmers', fishermen's and pastoralists' coping mechanism in the face of this variability. Long-term cycles of wet and dry periods are superimposed on seasonal dynamics. The 1950s and '60s were relatively wet. The 1970s and '80s were dry and caused the lake to shrink dramatically. From the 1990s onwards, an intermediate period has allowed the lake to expand again, but not to the level of the 1950s. Climate change is adding a third form of variability, enhancing the extremes.

Over the past 20 years, Lake Chad's south pool has been largely stable. The north pool has shown more yearly fluctuations, reflecting increased climatic variability. This puts additional stress on livelihoods. The good news is that groundwater recharge seems to have increased over this period, replenishing shallow groundwater resources around the lake. This suggests there is an opportunity to flexibly combine surface and groundwater use as a coping strategy in conditions of highly variable surface water availability. Such strategies are currently underdeveloped.

It is unclear when the next dry period will arrive that will make Lake Chad shrink again. Historic data suggest that these periods recur at 65-year intervals. The current cycle may be shorter. If so, the next dry period may start before the mid-2030s. It is important to take this into account, and reassess whether and how increased population densities will require relying less on mobility as the main resilience strategy. The evolution of water withdrawals in the basin for irrigation is also a factor that contributes to the lake's dynamic. The full implementation of the LCBC Water Charter is crucial in order to adequately manage water resources.

While the sections above reflect views shared by the participants, Annex 1 summarises discussions where expert views diverged. These are areas for research or cross-sector debate.

3. Regional Strategy

Participants agreed that the Regional Strategy developed by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Union Commission (AUC) provides effective guidance. Its nine pillars are a useful framework for action. Participants recommend that all parties embrace the strategy and focus more on implementing it in a coordinated manner. The broader issue of climate change should be well integrated into plans for implementation. Climate hazards like drought, rising temperatures and increasingly variable rainfall will impact on people, resources and livelihoods, exacerbating vulnerabilities. Some degree of adaptation will be necessary. Any development planning should therefore consider future climate conditions, be informed by climate risk assessments, promote adaptation and avoid maladaptation. The ability of institutions and governance systems to responsibly manage risk in general, and climate-related risk in particular, will need to be strengthened.

The Expert Meeting's focus on water, livelihoods and governance fell primarily under Regional Strategy pillars 1 (political cooperation at LCBC level), 5 (governance and social contract) and 6 (socioeconomic recovery). Cross-disciplinary conversations revealed, however, that meaningful implementation will also require simultaneous action on pillars 2, 3, and 4 (humanitarian-security-development nexus), pillar 7 (skills development), 8 (peacebuilding) and pillar 9 (empowerment and inclusion of women and young people). Participants agreed that the following points should be taken into consideration in implementing the strategy:

- Profound societal change has taken place in the past decade; there can be no return to the *status quo ante*. Many people displaced from rural areas to towns and cities are unlikely to return.
- The conflict has caused deep societal divisions. Massive support is needed in the areas of transitional justice, reconciliation and community healing, including mental healthcare and psychosocial support. To date this need remains largely unmet.
- In the wake of the conflict, a new social contract needs to be nurtured, between and within communities, ethnicities, religions, livelihoods and generations, between citizens and the state, and across national borders.
- Young people represent an increasingly large group in the population pyramid. Their education, empowerment and agency are essential for regional recovery and prosperity.
- As Lake Chad is far from the capitals, the state has never had much of a presence, and community mechanisms will remain a major basis for functional governance in the near future.
- Developing the humanitarian-development-security nexus requires a highly context-specific approach, distinguishing areas (i) of active conflict, (ii) where active conflict has receded but where vulnerability for flare-ups remains high, and (iii) of relative security, where socioeconomic development now needs to restart, acknowledging that the security situation is dynamic and that areas can move between different categories on the spectrum.
- Particularly in areas in categories (ii) and (iii), greater efforts are needed to transition from a humanitarian to a development approach, while ensuring a proper transition that does not increase vulnerability by cutting humanitarian assistance before development approaches have borne fruit.
- Efforts to make less safe areas more secure need to be stepped up.
- People-centric, inclusive approaches to security need to be adopted. Local communities need support in defining their own security needs and be empowered to address these themselves.
- Youth and women leaders need to play an important role in this. So do community, customary and religious institutions. There is a need for positive role models and dissemination of good practices.
- *All* livelihoods need to be considered in implementing the strategy: in primary production – family farming, fishing and pastoralism – as well as in the service economy that links production to markets.
- Some people in the region see international humanitarian and development actors as part of the solution, while others see them as part of the problem. Awareness of the political economy of the region is crucial.

4. The geographic and political space for action: a short-term agenda

Participants identified six spaces where progress can be made in implementing the Regional Strategy, which can have a positive impact on livelihoods and water in the short term. Each of these spaces requires cross-disciplinary efforts, connecting the dots in the social, economic, environmental and security domain. In each of these, inclusive, functional governance needs to be nurtured,

adapted to the local context. As stated above, customary and informal mechanisms will remain important in the formal/informal governance blend in the Lake Chad region.

An action agenda for these six spaces, incorporating cross-cutting issues such as equality, climate change, governance and engagement by groups that are usually marginalised, such as young people, people with disabilities and women, is summarised in the table below. It is elaborated in greater detail in Annex 2.

Spaces for action (for a more comprehensive version, see Annex 2)	Lead actor	Supporting actors	Pillars Regional Strategy
<p>1. Reconstitute/experiment with inclusive local governance models for diversified livelihoods in the Bol area, Chad, with links to markets</p> <p><i>Focusing on the existing Bol area polders, assess current governance models (formal/informal, community/state) and experiment with alternatives, with shared leadership including women, that are able to deliver services and infrastructure flexibly. Ensure fair, secure access to land across groups and prevent land conflict.</i></p>	<p>Local government, community leaders, young people and women's group leaders, academia, civil society organisations</p>	<p>ANADER, LCBC, AU, MNJTF, Nigeria-Chad mixed commission, Governors Forum, AFD, EC, World Bank, AfDB, Netherlands</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9</p>
<p>2. Invest in small cities as intermediate hubs between rural areas and large urban centres</p> <p><i>Strengthen the role of small cities as a bridge between rural areas and bigger cities, organise service delivery, rebuild the social contract between local government and citizens, promote value chain development, and invest in prospects for young people.</i></p>	<p>Local government, governors, community leaders, private sector, civil society organisations</p>	<p>World Bank, UNDP, AFD, AfDB, national ministries in basic services, finance ministries, Netherlands</p>	<p>4, 5, 6, 7 and 9</p>
<p>3. Support pastoralism as a driver of economic resilience</p> <p><i>Revisit and enable pastoralism (short/medium term, more/less mobile or intensive forms) as a resilience strategy and mechanism for regional integration and economic development; facilitate safe spaces and dialogue between communities, bridging societal divisions and promoting coexistence.</i></p>	<p>ECCAS, ECOWAS, national govts, LCBC, Governors Forum, community leaders, private sector, academia</p>	<p>AU, Nigeria-Chad mixed commission, customs services, AFD, private sector development actors</p>	<p>1, 5, 6, 8 and 9</p>
<p>4. Improve market access and facilitate cross-border trade</p> <p><i>Strengthen horizontal and cross-border governance, enable development of value chains at sub-national level in border regions, and redress gender-based harassment.</i></p>	<p>Private sector, customs services, security agencies</p>	<p>LCBC, Governors Forum, Nigeria-Chad mixed commission, official security agencies</p>	<p>1, 5, 6 and 9</p>
<p>5. Explore the opportunities for and risks of engaging military actors in protecting and restoring livelihoods</p> <p><i>Explore controversies and opportunities around engaging official security agencies as facilitators of development to restore livelihoods, protect and enable livelihood activities (farming, fisheries, pastoralism) and secure cross-border trade convoys.</i></p>	<p>Local government, security agencies, communities and religious leaders of various livelihood groups</p>	<p>Humanitarian actors, Governors Forum, MNJTF, LCBC, UN</p>	<p>2, 6 and 8</p>

<p>6. Enhance water resource management tools and governance arrangements</p> <p><i>Explore improved forecasting of water availability in the basin; reassess the impact of urban development and upstream irrigation development on water quality and quantity in the lake; support groundwater development where feasible. Support investment in water-saving schemes, and provide incentives by securing land rights.</i></p>	LCBC, sub-national basin authorities, local government, community leaders	UNDP, GIZ, World Bank, Netherlands	6
---	---	------------------------------------	---

Annex 1. Areas of controversy/disagreement between experts across disciplines

- Is it helpful to call all the increasingly diverse non-state armed groups 'Boko Haram'? A majority of experts believe it is not. They recommend using the term 'non-state armed groups'.
- Do we sufficiently understand the social and political root causes of society's disintegration, as a basis for designing remedial strategies and interventions? Social scientists believe that we do not and need to study this in greater depth.
- Are livelihood restrictions imposed by the military an effective strategy to defeat non-state armed groups and win the peace? Most experts agree that they will not restore peace, but rather worsen prospects for an end to conflict as well as food security.
- Do we have robust strategies to transition from humanitarian to development support? Several experts urge that more attention be paid to ensuring that vulnerable groups do not fall between the cracks.
- Can livelihood restoration heal social divisions and resolve political conflicts? Grievances about exclusion, inequality and corruption need to be redressed too. Economic issues are not the only ones.
- Is there a shared vision of socioeconomic development for a politically stable and prosperous Lake Chad region? Several experts underline the need to develop such vision collaboratively.
- Why hasn't there been more investment in enabling pastoralism's coexistence with sedentary livelihoods, as the former has long proved to be a resilient livelihood strategy? Most experts agree that a better enabling environment for pastoralism (including land rights) can reduce conflict with sedentary groups.
- Are pastoralist-farmer dynamics the main source of natural resource conflict? There is a risk of oversimplification; many conflicts occur within rather than between livelihoods groups.
- Is the lake disappearing or not? Experts agree the lake is chronically variable and could shrink or expand again in the future, but there is no evidence of a trend towards disappearance.
- Do climate change and water scarcity explain the current Lake Chad crisis? There is little evidence to support this claim. But growing population pressure is increasing the importance of wise management of water and land resources in the wider Lake Chad basin.
- Do we know enough about groundwater around the lake to develop robust strategies that combine surface and groundwater use as a strategy to cope with variability? Probably not.
- Is the increase in vegetation around the threshold separating Lake Chad's north and south pools a problem for ecosystem productivity? Some experts think it has a negative impact on the water balance and inflow into the north pool; others think it enriches the ecosystem and enhances livelihood opportunities.
- Experts have different views on whether upstream irrigation and urban or industrial development threaten the lake's downstream productive ecosystem. This requires more investigation.

Annex 2. Six Spaces for Short-term Action

1. *Reconstitute/experiment with inclusive local governance models for diversified livelihoods in the Bol area, Chad, with links to markets (pillars 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Regional Strategy)*
 - Assess the strengths and weaknesses of the polder projects in the Bol area (initiated under SODELAC in the 1950s, currently under ANADER), and identify factors in their success or failure as a basis for future projects.
 - Recognise and reconcile the different legitimate power structures, formal and informal, community and state, that apply to these polders and their associated value chains.
 - Assess in a participatory manner the social, economic and environmental functioning of these polders, who benefits and who doesn't. Identify the scope to improve their functioning, and in doing so strengthen the social contract (citizens-state, community-leaders, young-old, men-women, etc.) and social fabric.
 - Explore the scope to include young people, women, people with disabilities and those from other groups usually marginalised in decision-making, and to facilitate their agency. Leave room for local innovation, and build capacity at local level.
 - Facilitate dialogue in safe spaces on the coexistence of, and resource sharing among different livelihood groups; explore the scope for locally-led mediation of disputes over natural resource use and nonviolent dispute resolution mechanisms.
 - Facilitate negotiated and shared leadership across communities, livelihood, ethnic and religious groups, displaced communities, women's groups, community militias, etc.
 - Accompany the emergence of a flexible and mixed governance system that is rooted in local customs and able to adapt.
 - Address land use rights and their equitable allocation across *all* livelihoods groups, including pastoralists, and prevent elite capture.
 - Inform legislative processes (e.g. Chad's revision of its *code rural*) as appropriate.
 - Create a positive state presence, and leverage investments in Bol and between Bol and larger urban centres (as under point 2 below), while considering climate change impacts:
 - service delivery (education, health, water supply and sanitation, safety along corridors to markets) underpinned by an appropriate allocation of resources; and
 - infrastructure (rehabilitation and expansion of polders, road connection to N'Djamena and Nigeria, basic infrastructure along livestock corridors).
 - Explore expansion of the safe space around Bol by applying the strategy under point 5 below.
 - Accompany stakeholders at local, (sub-)national and intergovernmental levels (LCBC, MNJTF, Nigeria-Chad mixed commission, Governors Forum) in putting together the pieces of the informal and formal social, economic and security governance puzzle for relevant value chains.
 - Accompany the local leadership, as needed, in coordinating international support.
 - Plan for the resettlement of displaced populations in part of the polder zone; manage the pull factor in migration flows that the zone might create.
 - Explore opportunities to replicate this approach in e.g. the Diffa area in Niger.

2. *Invest in small cities as intermediate hubs between rural areas and large urban centres (addressing pillars 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the Regional Strategy)*
 - Start in relatively secure towns that are ready to shift from crisis mode towards recovery and development. At the same time, explore opportunities in less safe towns, in close collaboration with government security services.
 - Build on, or lay the groundwork for, Territorial Action Plans to be developed together with the Governors Forum as part of the Regional Strategy.
 - Develop a shared vision of social and economic development and (re-)constitute community-centred governance models, building on tradition as appropriate and strengthening the social contract.
 - Facilitate negotiated and shared leadership as under point 1 above, and develop the interfaces between formal and informal governance mechanisms.
 - Consider future climate scenarios in planning and infrastructure development.
 - Secure commitments from relevant local/(sub-)national actors to investigate what decentralisation requires in practice, including resource transfer and local revenue generation, as appropriate.
 - Carefully manage the transition from humanitarian aid to development.
 - Identify and develop priority urban infrastructure and services for socioeconomic recovery and development, such as mobile hospitals, communication and vocational training to prepare young people for the labour market.

- Develop value chains with processing facilities for primary products, market infrastructure and relevant support services in areas such as finance, marketing, logistics, etc.
 - Secure linkages with primary production areas and transport corridors to large cities.
 - Encourage the efficient collection of rents, using them to enhance service delivery and infrastructure, and in doing so build trust between citizens and the state.
 - Deliver support in the areas of transitional justice, reconciliation and community healing, including mental healthcare and psychosocial support, as needed.
3. *Support pastoralism as a driver of economic resilience (pillars 1, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of the Regional Strategy)*
- Reassess ways to better enable and support pastoralism and its coexistence with settled forms of agriculture, in a region where pastoralism has always been an effective strategy to cope with highly variable climate conditions and where climate variability is only increasing.
 - Reassess the rapid expansion in recent decades of the number of cattle and size of herds in particular in Chad, the dynamics that have caused this and ways to regulate it, if desirable.
 - Explore the full spectrum of pastoralism and the development of the associated meat value chains as a mechanism for regional integration and economic development.
 - Reassess natural resource sharing and conflict dynamics, taking account of land governance arrangements that accommodate settled livelihood groups better than migrant communities.
 - Use the findings as a starting point for political dialogue in the Governors Forum.
 - Explore appropriate and inclusive land tenure arrangements at local level, rooted in tradition, including their enforcement, which explicitly include pastoralism.
 - Facilitate the appropriate delineation and governance of livestock corridors, and provide sufficient water point access for herds.
 - Ensure that major infrastructure investments take pastoralists' interests into account.
 - Facilitate safe spaces for dialogue and coordination between communities in order to bridge societal divisions.
 - Look at pastoralism from a value chain perspective, and encourage private investment in processing (animal feed production, fattening stations, slaughterhouses, cool chain), product quality assurance and certification for the export of meat rather than cattle.
 - Locate processing facilities closer to grazing areas in Chad and Niger and farther from dense population centres that are the main market, thus reducing conflict with sedentary farmers.
 - Explore opportunities for young people related to pastoralism in the service economy and cross-border trade.
 - Improve pastoralists' access to humanitarian, development (improved breeding practices, animal healthcare, corridors) and peacebuilding interventions in relevant geographic areas.
 - Incorporate an analysis of pastoralists' experiences, realities and roles in conflict, political economy and gender relations in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating interventions.
 - Consider the full range of pastoralist livelihoods in the region, from highly mobile to practically sedentary, and the linkages between them.
4. *Improve market access and facilitate cross-border trade (pillars 1, 5, 6 and 9 of the Regional Strategy) – linked to initiative number 3 above*
- Explore opportunities in the Chadian livestock value chain for leather production in Maiduguri (enhancing incomes for pastoralists and creating jobs for over 15,000 people) or other markets.
 - Develop effective horizontal and cross-border governance mechanisms (both formal and informal where appropriate), enabling efficient value chains at sub-national level in border regions of Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria, and possibly Niger as well.
 - Explore what needs to be decided in the capitals and what can be decided at state level, and agree appropriate governance arrangements, taxation, etc.
 - Rehabilitate and develop infrastructure designed to support cross-border trade (e.g. cross-border markets and warehouses).
 - Ensure the promotion of cross-border trade policies in twin border cities (e.g. Kousséri-N'Djamena and Yagoua-Bongor).
 - Combat harassment of merchants, traders and transporters by customs and immigration officials at borders, possibly using the Governors Forum for this purpose.
 - Apply innovative approaches to make market information available to the wider population so as to reduce economic inefficiencies.

5. *Explore opportunities for and risks of engaging military actors in protecting and restoring livelihoods in less safe areas (pillars 2, 6 and 8 of the Regional Strategy)*
 - Explore controversies and opportunities around the engagement of government security forces as facilitators of development, in a context where many citizens do not trust these forces.
 - Explore opportunities for these forces to support the restoration of livelihoods and mitigate civilian harm. These may include protecting farming activities and firewood collection or escorting fishermen in areas where poor security make such activities too dangerous without protection.
 - Assess existing practices where government security forces are enabling development and draw lessons for do's and don'ts (avoiding military intervention as an economic actor in value chains)
 - Advise the Chief of Staff of the MNJTF on livelihood protection and restoration as part of a strategy to gradually reduce the recruitment base of non-stated armed groups.
 - Compensate for livelihood restrictions that official security agencies have put in place as a result of security concerns.
 - Secure cross-border trade convoys by land and water that are frequently the target of non-state armed groups or bandits, using safe passage to markets with military escorts as a way of boosting economic recovery.
 - Accompany such military escorts by other measures facilitating cross-border trade, including at checkpoints.
 - Reduce harassment at border crossings, focusing specifically on gender in view of the high percentage of women traders.
 - Improve road infrastructure to enhance access to markets and engage the military to secure safe passage.
 - Establish transparent taxation systems to ease the flow of goods.

6. *Enhance management tools and governance arrangements for water resources (pillar 6 of the Regional Strategy)*
 - Explore improved forecasting of water availability in the Lake Chad region and effective ways of communicating forecasts so that communities can better anticipate extreme weather.
 - Strengthen weather services' capacity to make seasonal forecasts and support their translation into actionable advice for various livelihood groups.
 - Strengthen organisations' capacity to forecast the effects of climate change and develop the tools regionally, in collaboration with hydromet services in the region and LCBC.
 - Reassess the impact of urban development, water usage and wastewater discharge on livelihood opportunities around the lake, and explore measures to redress negative impacts.
 - Develop and expand the collection and treatment of urban wastewater and faecal sludge in cities such as N'Djamena in order to protect the lake from pollution.
 - Reassess the impact of upstream irrigation development in the Lake Chad Basin and downstream and its impact on Lake Chad's dynamics, and collaboratively revisit water allocation arrangements.
 - Clarify water governance arrangements between various water management agencies at intergovernmental (LCBC), national and sub-national levels, and improve the exchange of information between them.
 - Promote the implementation of the LCBC Water Charter as a guiding document for water governance
 - Reinforce LCBC's capacity to carry out its water-related mandate.
 - Redress ad hoc dam releases and improve communication around such releases, in order to prevent unnecessary damage and casualties.
 - Enhance knowledge of groundwater resources in the Lake Chad Basin and their interaction with surface water, with a view to promoting and regulating groundwater exploitation.
 - Support communities around Lake Chad in developing the use of groundwater where feasible, and develop multiple source and conjunctive use strategies to cope with droughts.